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You're listening to Strictly Business
Podcast with Lindsay Williams.

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Since Donald J.

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Trump was inaugurated as president,
there's been a raft of executive orders

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and policy changes covering all sorts of
things,

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internal politics, geopolitics,
socioeconomic issues, tariffs, and so on.

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There's been an unintended consequence, I
think, when it comes to Mr.

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Trump's intentions.

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U.S.

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market participants have been rattled by
these changes.

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With me is Philip Saunders.

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director, Investment Institute at 91 in

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London. I was looking at an FT post on
LinkedIn the other day, Philip,

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and there was a lot of MSCI index
performance graphs.

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And the US one was heading south,

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and the other ones were either going
sideways or going north, notably in

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Europe.

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Are you seeing people saying, wait a
second, US asset classes have had their

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day, and we should be looking elsewhere?

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Well, I think it probably isn't quite as
simple as that.

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But it's clear that we've been through a
period of US exceptionalism.

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US assets have performed absolutely and
relatively extremely well.

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And a lot of other markets have, frankly,
been disappointing.

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I mean, if you look at the performance
since COVID, for example, US equities,

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even with the recent correction,

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have trounced European equities and
Chinese equities.

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So I think that the issue is this, you
know, how far can the elastic stretch?

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Because, you know, part of it is justified
because, you know,

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clearly the U.S.

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is probably the most shareholder friendly
environment.

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Productivity growth has been superior to
other economies on a sustained basis.

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And also index composition is different.

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So part of the relative performance is a
function of index composition.

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So I don't think we should get too carried
away about this.

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However, the relative valuation of U.S.

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assets, you know, take the dollar as well,
you know, has, you know,

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did reach extraordinary levels sort of
over the course of 2025, and particularly

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after that,

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after Trump was elected.

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And so to some extent, you know, elastic
stretches and then it contracts.

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And we're in one of those contraction
phases.

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Whether that then turns into, you know,
that we've seen the peak U.S.

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exceptionalism and U.S.

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assets basically now move into a sustained
period of underperformance.

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Well, really, the jury's probably out on
that one, to be realistic.

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You've sort of answered my next question,
which was, is this just a blip?

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Is this just a sort of market reallocation
for a short term gain or loss,

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whatever it is?

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Or do you think that this trend may become
entrenched, in other words,

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the MSCI USA underperforming the Europe
MSCI?

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Sure.

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So I think for the time being, I think
that, you know, actually, you know, truth

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be told, nobody knows.

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But for the time being, it seems that, you
know, it's not going to be a straight

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line,

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but it seems that sort of the cyclical
environment.

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probably favours it continuing for the
time being.

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And then we can decide at a later date
whether it's basically much more

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structural.

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But for the time being, what's happened is
that we came into this year with very,

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very elevated expectations for US growth
and US earnings, consequently,

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on top of that.

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And the policy volatility that's been
introduced by Trump and the activity

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of Doge.

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in reducing spending in a very federal
government spending in a very visible way

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that

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combined with a natural ebbing of economic
growth which you can see in the employment

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figures has

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undermined these expectations coming into
the year and

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given the high valuations of US equities
you know if you basically have anything

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that casts doubt on

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the deliverability of earnings
expectations in double digits type levels,

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then, you know,

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there's a risk of a market setback or
correction.

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And that's exactly what we've seen.

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On top of this, we've seen positioning,
you know, again, pretty extreme,

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everybody's loaded up with US assets,
because US assets have outperformed for so

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long, and people, it's been a momentum
market,

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and it's sucked more money into the into
the leaders.

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And, you know, conversely, the narrative
for Europe was that Europe basically is

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irredeemably unproductive.

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troubled.

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And Germany basically has significant
structural problems.

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Its Chinese customers are becoming
competitors and all that kind of thing.

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Europe's overregulated the whole story.

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And there's a lot of truth in that.

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But basically, positioning had got very,
very light.

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So a lot of this is just simply a
positioning adjustment in the light of a

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questioning.

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of the relative growth prospects for, say,
the EU and other economies and the US.

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OK, so US assets.

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Let's focus on equities, if we can.

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Maybe a little bit overstretched when it
comes to valuations, whichever valuation

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you favour, price, earnings, whatever it
is.

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But European equities, underinvested in
and a little bit lower.

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So people are saying, well, this is a good
excuse for us to redress the balance

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somewhat.

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That's the first point.

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The second point is, do people like...

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European unity, because you've got Sir
Keir Starmer, the Prime Minister of the

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United Kingdom, getting people together,

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26 people on an online call and
everything.

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And do people like that?

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Do they say, right, we're going to take on
this Trump fellow?

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Yeah, I don't think it's really about
that.

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And because a lot of that is just sort of
posing.

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There is something fundamental underneath
it all.

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And that is the fact that basically the...

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The new prospective German Chancellor,
Merz,

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is pushing forward pretty rapidly to try
and get the fiscal debt break taken off or

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circumvented

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in Germany.

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And this is critical because Germany
basically only has a debt to GDP ratio of

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60%, whereas

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France, it's over 100.

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And so Germany is in a reasonably good,
relatively speaking, reasonably good

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fiscal position.

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So the fact that Germany is moving to
reflate on top of, you know,

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obviously reductions in interest rates in
the EU,

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that is much more consequential than Keir
Starmer trying to sort of lead Europe in

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its sort of opposition to

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both Trump and also Russia.

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All right.

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So you've had a look at the graphs I
described in my introduction.

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You've said to yourself, OK, a perfectly
natural readjustment in the short term.

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term, you don't, from what I can gather,
think that this is a medium and long-term

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readjustment.

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So I think that, you know, there is a case
for that being so.

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And I think that, you know, because all
things go in these long cycles, you know,

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we probably pass peak US exceptionalism,

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but it's not a sort of straight line.

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Okay.

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So if you like, back in the day, these
tend to map with dollar cycles, you know,

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cycles of dollar strength.

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So in the 1980s, you saw the Reagan
period, and that was another phase of U.S.

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exceptionalism.

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And that peaked in 1985 with the dollar
trading at astronomical levels relative to

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the Deutschmark then.

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And then there's been a subsequent phase
which sort of petered out before the

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global financial crisis.

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So, you know, they tend to sort of be
cycles.

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And so we may well be entering a different
cycle whereby American exceptionalism is

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less.

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However, I think that there are a number
of things that, you know,

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the Trump administration is taking some
risks with the economy here in order to

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actually achieve

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fiscal sustainability.

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And if they succeed in doing that,

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it's arguably worth taking a bit of pain
in the short term and in order to actually

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put the.

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US economy on a sort of firmer footing.

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So to write the US economy off, I think is
wrong.

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But clearly, valuations are elevated.

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And if you look at actually forward, 12
month forward PE multiples, you know, it's

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actually been fairly modest.

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The US is trading at something just over
20 times 12 months forward earnings.

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Germany is on 14.8.

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The UK is 12.2.

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And China is 12.

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So there is still a very significant gap.

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and that will not fully close, I don't
believe, but there's clearly scope for it

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to sort of normalise from where we are at
the

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moment.

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OK, let's go from equities now.

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Final question.

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US bonds, German bonds and the euro-dollar
exchange rate.

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I mean, the euro-dollar exchange rate is
terribly, terribly important when you've

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got two massive trading blocks.

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Is it important that the US dollar has
weakened so significantly against the

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euro?

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and is it terribly important that the
German Bund yields have been rising

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because as many people say simplistically
because they want to

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spend so much on military stuff.

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Yeah, well, I think we can debate whether
or not the productivity impact of spending

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on defence is

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worth it, but it's happening.

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And European industry needs a catalyst,

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because basically the Chinese are now
extremely competitive in many areas that

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Germany particularly used to dominate.

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And energy costs, because of the sort of
green initiatives, have...

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have become very significant.

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So in many senses, basic Germany has
become less competitive as a result of

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that.

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And so, you know, defence spending is sort
of classic industrial spending.

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And, you know, that has pretty significant
multiplier effects, at least in the sort

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of short to medium term.

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So I think that is potentially a bit of a
game changer for Europe.

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And it means that, you know, a recovery
that, you know, is showing signs of coming

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through it.

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at any rate, ends up basically getting a
sort of fiscal shot in the arm as well.

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And so that means that the growth
trajectory in Europe, you know,

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whilst not spectacular on a sort of medium
to longer term basis, at least on a

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cyclical horizon, you know,

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looks significantly better than it looked,
say, sort of six to 12 months ago.

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And that is significant because it's
coming at a time when U.S. growth

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expectations, having been very robust,

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are actually being revised down.

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So that relative position,

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relative market performance tends to be
pretty sensitive to that, particularly if

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it's backed up by positioning differences,
which we believe it is.

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I said that was the final question, but it
wasn't the final question because I want

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to know if 91 has changed its position
slightly,

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even the smallest little tweak, Philip.

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Yeah, so we, in...

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our sort of outlook piece that we
discussed earlier on in January,

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we made the case that it was time to be
moving away from this excessive

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bias towards US assets.

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And timing is always difficult, but by and
large,

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you'd have too much concentration and the
relative valuation differentials were just

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simply too high,

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at least on a medium term basis.

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Now, the Trump effect obviously sort of
continued this sort of, you know,

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continued this relative outperformance up
until relatively recently.

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But that now seems to be seems to have
turned.

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And I think that turn is turn is it.

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So having more diversified portfolios,
reducing dollar exposure, reducing U.S.

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equity exposure, which, of course, is
being as the U.S.

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outperformed.

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something like the MSCA Global Index,
Equity Index,

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the allocation to the US becomes higher
and higher.

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And back in the 1980s, I mean, Japanese
equities got up to something like

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45% of the global index, which of course
was ridiculous.

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Now, obviously, depending on which index
you look at, you know,

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US equity allocations sort of get up into
the sort of 65 plus.

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percent mark, which of course is, you
know,

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really doesn't make sense in terms of so
more diversified approach at these kind of

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relative valuation levels

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made a lot of sense to us.

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And it's better to be too early than too
late.

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Always.

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Philip, thank you very much for your
analysis.

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Philip Saunders is Director, Investment
Institute at 91 in London.

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The views and opinions expressed in these
podcasts are those of Lindsay Williams and

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various contributors.

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and do not reflect the policy, position,
or opinion of any other agency,

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organization, employer,

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or company associated with
StrictlyBusinessPodcast.com.

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Assumptions made on the analyses are not
reflective of the position of any other

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entity other than the speaker or the
author.

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And since we are critically thinking human
beings, these views are always subject to

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change, revision,

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and rethinking at any time.

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Please do not hold us to them in
perpetuity.
